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NNCSDetecting consciousness in a total locked-in syndrome: 
An active event-related paradigm
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Total locked-in syndrome is characterized by tetraplegia, anarthria and paralysis of eye motility. In this study, con-
sciousness was detected in a 21-year-old woman who presented a total locked-in syndrome after a basilar artery
thrombosis (49 days post-injury) using an active event-related paradigm. The patient was presented sequences of
names containing the patient’s own name and other names. The patient was instructed to count her own name or to
count another target name. Similar to 4 age- and gender-matched healthy controls, the P3 response recorded for the
voluntarily counted own name was larger than while passively listening. This P3 response was observed 14 days
before the first behavioral signs of consciousness. This study shows that our active event-related paradigm allowed
to identify voluntary brain activity in a patient who would behaviorally be diagnosed as comatose.
Keywords: Locked-in syndrome; Evoked potentials; Consciousness; Brain injury; Tetraplegia.
INTRODUCTION
The locked-in syndrome (LIS) refers to patients
who are totally paralyzed but fully conscious and
able to use vertical eye movements or blinking in
order to communicate (Plum & Posner, 1966,
1983). More recently, the American Congress of
Rehabilitation Medicine (1995) characterized the
LIS by the presence of sustained eye opening,
aphonia or severe hypophonia, quadriplegia or
quadriparesis, preserved cognitive functioning,
and a primary and elementary code of communi-
cation using vertical eye movements or blinking
(American Congress of Rehabilitation Medicine,
1995). According to Bauer, the LIS can neverthe-
less be subdivided on the basis of motor impair-
ments: classical LIS is characterized by total
immobility except for vertical eye movements or
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272 SCHNAKERS ET AL.
blinking; incomplete LIS permits remnants of
voluntary motion; and total LIS consists of com-
plete immobility including all eye movements
combined with preserved consciousness (Bauer,
Gerstenbrand, & Rumpl, 1979).
Detecting signs of consciousness in these
patients is particularly challenging. A study
performed in collaboration with the French Asso-
ciation for the LIS (ALIS; http://alis-asso.fr/)
showed that physicians realized that the patient
was conscious and able to communicate via eye
movements in only 62% of cases (Bruno et al.,
2008). Additionally, the time elapsed between the
insult and the diagnosis of LIS is about 78 days
(Laureys et al., 2005). Difficulties in diagnosis
could be explained by the apparent similarity with
the vegetative state (i.e., eyes opening and motor
immobility without signs of awareness) (The
Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, 1994), by the
rarity of this syndrome but also by a possible fluc-
tuation of the arousal level in the acute setting or
by the difficulty to recognize unambiguous signs
of consciousness in severely brain injured patients
(Majerus, Gill-Thwaites, Andrews, & Laureys,
2005). In the case of a total LIS, there are no
behavioral signs of consciousness such as oriented
eye movements which can be detected. Rates of
misdiagnosis are likely to be very high in this
extreme form of LIS. Early detection of signs of
consciousness in the LIS is crucial as regards to
end-of-life decisions but also medical treatment
(particularly, considering treatment of pain and
anxiety).
As behavioral tools are not sufficient, paramedi-
cal tools have therefore to be developed in order to
facilitate the detection of signs of consciousness.
Electrophysiology constitutes an interesting tech-
nique as it requires direct recording of the brain
activity without the intervention of behavioral
responses. The purpose of the present study is to
present an active event-related potentials paradigm
which permitted to detect voluntary brain
responses in a total LIS patient.
METHODS
Patient history
This 21-year-old woman was admitted to the inten-
sive care with headache, diarrhea, vomiting, and
dysarthria. She deteriorated becoming apparently
comatose. Indeed, she did not open her eyes even
with stimulation. Pupillary responses were pre-
served. Stereotyped response was observed follow-
ing noxious stimulation. She did not respond to
verbal command. No verbalizations were
observed. EEG was characterized by diffuse theta
activity and preserved somatosensory evoked
potentials (N20) were obtained. Magnetic reso-
nance imaging (MRI) showed ischemic lesions of
brainstem, cerebellum and left thalamus. There
were no abnormalities seen in cortical regions.
(18F)fluorodeoxyglucose-PET scanning performed
14 days after brain insult revealed an hypometabo-
lism involving brainstem, cerebellum and left tha-
lamus but a preservation of supra-tentorial areas.
She required ventilation via a tracheostomy, a per-
cutaneous enterogastrectomy feeding tube, and an
indwelling catheter. There was no change during
the first 3 weeks, and the patient was transferred to
the neurology unit.
As regards to aetiology (i.e., basilar thrombo-
sis) and functional imaging findings (i.e., preser-
vation of supra-tentorial areas), the diagnosis of
a ‘total’ LIS, as described by Bauer et al. (1979)
was considered. Cognitive auditory event-related
potentials which will be outlined in detail in the
next section were therefore performed on the
25th, 39th and 49th day after brain insult to
demonstrate the existence of voluntary brain
responses in this patient. The patient was free of
sedative and other centrally acting drugs for at
least 24 h. Fourteen days after the last event-
related potentials’ recordings (63rd day after
brain insult), the first sign of consciousness was
observed (i.e., inconsistent but reproducible fin-
ger movements). At that moment, she was trans-
ferred to a rehabilitation centre where she made
slow but progressive improvement. Her left arm
power recovered from distal to proximal mus-
cles, as has been noted in LIS patients (Richard
et al., 1995). Head movements were possible and
permitted communication. She smiled in an
appropriate context. However, severe emotional
lability such as pathologic laughing and crying
(i.e., she displayed these emotions involuntarily,
often in response to inappropriate stimuli) was
noted. She was discharged home 12 months after
stroke, fully dependent in all personal activities
of daily living. Currently, she still lives with her
parents.
Our study was approved by the Ethics Commit-
tee of the University of Liège and written informed
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Event-related paradigm
Nine sequences of 120 auditory stimuli were
developed. Each sequence included 8 first names
(the subject’s own name and 7 other unfamiliar
names) repeated 15 times and presented in a rand-
omized order. The unfamiliar names were selected
from previous studies (Perrin, Garcia-Larrea,
Mauguiere, & Bastuji, 1999; Perrin et al., 2006)
and are all of common use in the French language.
The inter-stimulus interval time was of 1500 ms.
Each patient’s family was asked whether some of
the unfamiliar names had an emotional import-
ance for the patient (e.g., close relatives name). The
emotionally significant names were excluded from
the analysis. All stimuli had been recorded by the
same female voice with a neutral intonation, digi-
tized and were then replayed binaurally during the
experiment (at maximum 90 dB sound pressure
level).
The event-related paradigm included one passive
and two active conditions (3 sequences per condi-
tion). The passive listening condition was first
presented to the subject and was followed by two
active conditions presented in randomized order.
In the active conditions, the patient was asked to
either count one specified target unfamiliar name
(target unfamiliar name condition), or to count
her/his own name (own name condition).
Event-related potentials’ acquisition
Stimuli were presented via earphones and data
were acquired at the bedside. Event-related
potentials’ recordings were performed with the
eyes closed and minimal ambient noise. Event-
related potentials were recorded from Fz, Cz and
Pz (Klem, Luders, Jasper, & Elger, 1999) and ref-
erenced to the nose. Electro-oculogram (EOG)
was acquired using 2 electrodes placed diagonally
above and below the right eye. A ground elec-
trode was placed near Fz and impedances were
kept below 5 kΩ. Data were collected at a
sampling rate of 500 Hz using a NuAmp EEG
amplifier (NeuroSoft, Sterling, VA, USA) with
analog bandpass filtering of 0.1–200 Hz. Stand-
ardized stimulation (i.e., deep pressure and audi-
tory stimuli) was performed prior to each
sequence to improve arousal (Giacino, Kalmar, &
Whyte, 2004). Additionally, event-related poten-
tials was performed when bispectral monitoring
(Aspect Medical Systems, Newton, USA) showed
bispectral index values above 90 (Sleigh, Andrze-
jowski, Steyn-Ross, & Steyn-Ross, 1999). A 5-
min break separated each condition of the event-
related paradigm.
Event-related potentials’ analysis
Using Neuroscan software (NeuroSoft, Sterling,
VA, USA), single epochs (–200 to 1300 ms) with
an amplitude ≥ ± 75μv on EOG electrodes were
discarded from further analysis. Event-related
potentials were averaged as a function of target
(i.e., the subject’s own name or the target unfa-
miliar name) and non-target (i.e., average of the
6 not-to-be-counted unfamiliar names) events in
each condition. In order to ensure equivalent
signal-to-noise ratios, we compared event-
related potentials to targets and non-targets
obtained with a same number of trials (i.e., non-
targets preceding the targets were selected). For
illustrative propose, the averaged data were dig-
itally filtered from 1 to 40 Hz (6 db). Four age-
matched healthy control subjects (3 women; 25
years old) were also recorded. Grand-averaged
event-related potentials were constructed for
control subjects.
Statistical analysis
Amplitudes and latencies of the N1, P2, N2 and
P3 components were calculated for individual
averages. For each component, we choose the
maximum amplitude and its associated latency
(in a temporal window predefined on grand-
averaged event-related potentials). Amplitude
differences (1) between targets (i.e., the subject’s
own name and the target unfamiliar name) and
non-targets (i.e., not-to-be-counted unfamiliar
names) in each of the 3 conditions and (2)
between targets in passive and targets in active
conditions were tested at an individual level at
Fz, Cz and Pz using T scores. This analysis takes
into account the variance of the EEG recordings
composing the averaged event-related potentials
(Perrin et al., 2006). T scores were computed for
control subjects and patient in a temporal win-
dow of 50 ms around the peak latency of each
component. Results were considered significant
when p values were below .05 within the tempo-
ral window of 50 ms. Additionally, in order to
determine whether the patient’s amplitudes and




































274 SCHNAKERS ET AL.
from control performance, modified t-tests were
performed (Crawford & Garthwaite, 2002).
Behavioral assessment
Before each event-related potentials’ assessment, the
consciousness level was determined by means of the
Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (Giacino et al., 2004).
This scale consists of 23 hierarchically arranged items
that comprise six subscales addressing arousal, audi-
tory, visual, motor, oromotor/verbal and communi-
cation functions. The lowest item on each subscale
represents reflexive activity while the highest item
represents cognitively-mediated behaviors.
RESULTS
Considering the four controls’ grand average, a
larger P3 response was observed for the subject’s
own name vs. the unfamiliar names in the passive
condition (at Fz, Cz and Pz). Moreover, a signifi-
cantly higher P3 was obtained when the targets
(i.e., the subject’s own name and the target unfa-
miliar name) had to be counted (active conditions)
rather than only listened to (passive condition) (at
Fz, Cz and Pz sites). A larger P3 was also observed,
for the counted targets as compared to passive
listening to unfamiliar names (at Fz, Cz and Pz
sites) (Table 1 and Figure 1). Additionally, each
control subject had a larger P3 response for the
own name in the passive condition as well as a
larger P3 response for the counted targets in the
active condition. The results were hence identical
when considering each control subject individually.
For the patient, event-related potentials’ record-
ings were performed on the 25th, 39th and 49th
day after brain insult. Significant task related P3
changes were observed in the last recording session
(i.e., 49th day post-insult). During this session, the
patient had firstly to count the target unfamiliar
name (target unfamiliar name condition) and then
to count the own name (own name condition). The
results presented here are based only on this last
event-related potentials’ assessment session.
For this assessment, a larger P3 response was
observed for the subject’s own name vs. the unfa-
miliar names in the passive condition (at Cz). More-
over, a significantly higher P3 was obtained when
the subject’s own name had to be counted (in the
active condition) rather than only listened to (in the
passive condition) (at Cz and Pz). A larger P3 was
TABLE 1 
(a) Upper panel: event-related potentials’ amplitudes (in μv) at Pz for P3 component in response to subject’s 
own name (SON) in both passive (listened SON) and active (counted SON) conditions for our LIS patient, for 
the control group (average) and for each control subject (n = 4) The mark (*) indicates differences (p < .05) 
in P3 amplitudes obtained for the counted vs. the listened SON and the counted SON vs. non counted 
unfamiliar names (UN). (b) Lower panel: event-related potentials’ amplitudes (in μv) at Pz for P3 component 
in response to the target unfamiliar name (TUN) in both passive (listened TUN) and active (counted TUN) 
conditions for our LIS patient, for the control group (average) and for each control subject (n = 4). The mark 
(*) indicates differences (p < .05) in P3 amplitudes obtained for the counted vs. the listened TUN and the 
counted TUN vs. non counted unfamiliar names (UN)





LIS 11.7 12.6 * *
Controls 5.5 ± 1.9 14.6 ± 5.1 * *
Control 1 3.7 18 * *
Control 2 7.2 16.3 * *
Control 3 4 7.1 * *
Control 4 7.1 17.1 * *





LIS 5.1 5.7 – –
Controls 3.1 ± 1.8 10.9 ± 2.1 * *
Control 1 2 12.4 * *
Control 2 5.7 12.7 * *
Control 3 2.8 8.2 * *
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also observed in the active condition for the counted
subject’s own name as compared to non-counted
targets (i.e., unfamiliar names) (at Fz and Pz).
However, no larger P3 response was observed for
the counted target unfamiliar name (in the active
condition) as compared to the listened target unfa-
miliar name (in the passive condition) or as compared
to non-counted targets (i.e., unfamiliar names in the
active condition) (Table 1 and Figure 1).
The amplitude of P3 responses was not signifi-
cantly different between the patient and controls for
the subject’s own name in passive and active condi-
tions. However, the latency of P3 responses signifi-
cantly differed between controls and the patient for
the counted subject’s own name in the active condi-
tion (Fz, t = 6.1, p < .01; Cz, t = 4.9, p < .01; Pz, t =
4.5, p = .01); higher latencies being observed in our
patient as compared to controls.
Finally, at a behavioral level, the patient showed
no eye opening, no response-to-command related
eye movements (following manual eye opening),
no visual fixation or tracking, no visual or auditory
startle, but bilateral Babinski signs with hyper-
reflexive quadriplegia, abnormal posturing to pain
and oral reflexive movement. Additionally, we
observed preserved pupillary responses to light.
Vertical and horizontal oculocephalic reflexes were
nevertheless absent.
DISCUSSION
In our patient and in all controls, we found a larger
P3 response following the presentation of the own
name in the passive condition. This result could
suggest that our patient was able to consciously
Figure 1. Grand-averaged event-related potentials in our LIS patient and in healthy volunteers (n = 4) at Pz. Upper panels depict the
response to the subject’s own name (SON) in the passive condition (listened target SON; in green) and in the active condition (counted
target SON; in red) vs. unfamiliar names (listened non-targets UN; in blue). Lower panels depict the response to the target unfamiliar
name (TUN) in the passive condition (listened target TUN; in green) and in the active condition (counted target TUN; in red) vs. unfa-
miliar names (listened non-targets UN; in blue). To view this figure in colour, please visit the online version of this issue. 
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276 SCHNAKERS ET AL.
detect her own first name. However, a previous study
of Perrin et al., 2006) showed a larger amplitude in
response to the patients’ own name as compared to
unfamiliar names in all controls but also in 3 out 5
patients diagnosed as being in a vegetative state.
Furthermore, it is known that speech processing can
be observed in unconscious state such as anesthesia
(Davis et al., 2007) or sleep (Perrin et al., 1999).
Therefore, responses observed during passive listen-
ing conditions probably reflect automatic speech
processing and are not sufficient to suggest volun-
tary and therefore conscious brain activity.
Using our active event-related paradigm, we
observed that our patient had a larger P3 response
for the counted subject’s own name as compared to
the not-to-be counted names and as compared to
passive listening of the subject’s own name. In
addition, the P3 amplitude observed in these con-
ditions was similar to that observed in controls.
This suggests that, like controls, the patient was
able to understand and to respond to verbal
instructions (i.e., she could voluntary focalize her
attention on the target stimulus). Additionally, the
bispectral index was superior to 90 during the
event-related potentials’ recording. This would
exclude a comatose state. Indeed, a previous study
has shown that unconscious severely brain injured
patients (i.e., in a coma or in a vegetative state) had
a mean bispectral index value inferior to 50,
whereas conscious severely brain injured patients
(i.e., in a minimally conscious state or emerging
from this state) had a mean bispectral index value
superior to 50 (Schnakers, Majerus, & Laureys,
2005). Our results can also be related to those
observed in a case report using an active event-
related fMRI paradigm (i.e., mental imagery)
which showed brain activation patterns similar to
controls in one patient diagnosed as being in a veg-
etative state, suggesting that this patient was actu-
ally able to voluntarily follow task instructions,
and hence was conscious to some extent (Owen
et al., 2006). Our study stresses the interest of act-
ive event-related paradigms for detecting signs of
consciousness and underlines the possibility to use
these paradigms at the patient’s bedside by means
of cognitive evoked potentials. Finally, it is inter-
esting to note that this voluntary brain activity was
detected 14 days before the first behavioral signs of
consciousness (i.e., a reproducible response to ver-
bal order – ‘move your finger’, appearing with the
recovery of some motor activity).
Our results showed a larger P3 response for the
counted subject’s own name during the third
recording (i.e., 49th day after the onset). The
absence of response during the first and second
assessments (i.e., 25th and 39th day after the onset,
respectively) can be related to the Onofrj and col-
leagues’ study. In this study, the authors observed
the reappearance of P3 responses in a locked-in
patient only 55 days post onset (Onofrj, Melchionda,
Thomas, & Fulgente, 1996). This result could be
partly explained by initially impaired conscious-
ness levels. Indeed, the time course would be con-
sistent with the patient being comatose early on
and eventually entering a minimally conscious
state (i.e., inconsistent but reproducible signs of
awareness) (Giacino et al., 2002) on the last record-
ing. Recently, we observed that 9 out of 14 mini-
mally conscious patients presented a larger P3 to
the to-be-counted target name suggesting volun-
tary compliance to task instructions (Schnakers
et al., 2008). Similarly to our patient, we observed
a larger latency for the to-be-counted target name
in these patients as compared to controls, reflect-
ing a suboptimal recruitment of cognitive processes
necessary to perform the task. Additionally,
responses were observed in only one of the two act-
ive conditions. This was interpreted to be related to
vigilance fluctuations which are characteristic of
patients in a minimally conscious state (Giacino
et al., 2002). These results are similar to what we
observed in our patient as the P3 response
observed was obtained in only one of the two act-
ive conditions (i.e., the own name condition).
However, the existence of fluctuations in vigilance
cannot be ruled out. This result could also be
explained by the fact that actively counting the
own name is easier to perform than counting an
unfamiliar name. Indeed, it is well documented
that the own name is a powerful attention grabbing
stimulus that elicits an automatic increase of vigi-
lance (e.g., ‘cocktail party phenomenon’) (Laureys,
Perrin, & Bredart, 2007). Drawing attention to an
already salient stimulus such as the subjects own
name might thus be more easily achieved than scan-
ning all other names against the to-be-counted tar-
get name. Moreover, our patient presented a lesion
in the thalamus which is known to be part of atten-
tional and short-term memory networks necessary
in maintaining and updating information during a
counting task (Constantinidis & Procyk, 2004).
The fundamental finding here is that our patient
was able to respond as a function of task require-
ments in at least one of the conditions, suggesting
that they are able to voluntarily follow relatively
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so. In conclusion, this active auditory event-related
paradigm (requiring explicit comprehension of
auditory-verbal instructions) provides an interest-
ing tool for detecting voluntary brain activity in
patients that behaviorally would be diagnosed as
comatose. This paradigm nevertheless needs to be
validated in larger groups of LIS patients.
Original manuscript received 10 September 2008
Revised manuscript accepted 10 December 2008
First published online 25 February 2009
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